Coalition of the Willing
by Donald Devine
Octover 21, 2006

With the number of Iraqi deaths ten times higher over six months, a top U.S. general saying civil war is immanent, and a normally cool expert like Anthony Cordesman saying “trying to declare there isn’t a civil war borders on the absurd,” is it surprising that George W. Bush ally and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III is promising new ideas from his commission after the election? A good place to begin is with the most useful of the Bush Doctrine ideas, the “coalition of the willing.”

We have come a long way from “freedom fries.” The French are back in good grace and their potato is again in the White House mess. From a vulnerable moment as the United States was reeling from the terrible blows of 9/11 and was expecting blind agreement from its allies, the President and his Administration have led the country to understand the essential need for allies and cooperative international agreements.

Allies actually have assumed the leading roles in two of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. and the world, negotiating about nuclear weapons with the nations President Bush labeled as evil, North Korea and Iran. Actually, from the beginning the president relied almost entirely for conventional forces on the Northern Alliance ally in Afghanistan, the U.S. supplying mostly air and special-forces support, and assembled a coalition of the willing in Iraq. Today, NATO has taken over leadership in Afghanistan with U.S. troops only in support and local troops are taking the lead in Iraq. Still, the idea of coalitions could be extended even further.

any on the right still see reliance on allies and coalitions as a weakness or as too restrictive of U.S. initiative. While recognizing President Bush’s determination as a leader, former Speaker Newt Gingrich--in a recent speech to the neocon American Enterprise Institute--criticized Bush’s policies as needing “real change,” requiring a more aggressive role in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and within America itself. Neoconservative guru Norman Podhoretz, self-described advocate of World War IV against Islam, points to “the international community” as the actual cause of America’s problems--by “defining torture down,” by forbidding its use to the U.S. “The only reason in my opinion that we’re having as much trouble as we’re having in Iraq is that we’re not getting intelligence.…and you can only get that kind of intelligence by squeezing it out of prisoners. That is all there is to it.”

Many were concerned about the president at his recent news conference. While confirming his desire “to stay the course,” he added “changing tactics” were constantly necessary “to achieve a strategic goal.” He agreed “completely” with Republican Senate Armed Services chairman John Warner’s concerns that “if the plan isn’t working, adjust.” He even added “I learned a lesson and decided the best way to convince Kim Jong-Il to change his mind on a nuclear weapons program is to have others send the same message.” Not that the president was weakening his resolve—he told author Bob Woodward he would stay the course in Iraq even if Laura and his dog were the only ones who still supported him there.

At his news conference, President Bush not only announced his strategy to have allies deliver a strong message to North Korea but for competitor nations such as China too, specifically praising Japan, South Korea and China for their resolve, which later produced a unanimous U.N. Security Council resolution imposing sanctions. But why must President Bush do all the heavy lifting? The countries in the region are the ones who are threatened by Kim’s bomb and delivery system, not the U.S. It is China who is weakened if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear arms. It is mostly a regional problem. The following day, a State Department official mused that this cooperation could expand into a NATO-like treaty that might not only contain North Korea but stabilize the entire region—and, he might have added, take pressure off the U.S. too. Dealing with North Korea is a perfect example of how the concept of a coalition of the willing should be expanded.

etting affairs develop regionally helps diffuse conflicting interests and allows local knowledge close to the action to inform the solution of the problem. It also means the U.S. does not have to play the heavy every time. The model has already proved itself on the international scene regarding nuclear weapons. Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative was organized on a coalition of the willing basis to confirm and publicize and ultimately to end Libya’s clandestine nuclear program. It exposed A.Q. Khan’s world proliferation machine and secured Pakistan’s agreement to end its operations. It has intercepted North Korea weapons shipments—all without focusing attention on a harping Uncle Sam.

Iraq is the toughest case. The original plan was for the U.S.-led coalition to turn over power to a local one last year with the election of the new all-faction government. While it and the still involved U.S. forces have not been able to stem the violence, some form of regionalism is widely recognized as the only solution. The Kurds already have autonomy—and peace. After absolutely rejecting federation as recently as last year, it was a powerful Shiite party just this month that pushed the parliament to approve a federalism plan that would allow autonomous provinces or regions. The Sunni are the main sticking point since they view regionalism or federalism as a means to pauperize its resources-poor areas. So total partition will not work either--some national programs such as sharing oil revenue with and amnesty for Sunnis will be necessary, which the Kurds and Shiites have not been willing to do.

nfortunately, strong elements within both the Sunni and Shiite are puling things apart. A leading Shiite group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (and their Badr Brigade), became big supporters of federalism when it realized it could dominate the new region. The good news was it used its significant influence to win the parliamentary vote on federalism by 141 to 0. The bad news is that not only the Sunni but Moqtada al-Sadr’s radical Shiites—the largest single party--boycotted the vote, leaving the tally 134 votes short. One important Sunni group, the Mujaheddin Shura Council, very recently and for the first time called for autonomy for an “Islamic Republic” running from Baghdad and Kirkuk west. But it was vehemently opposed by the Sunni Islamic Army and the influential Muslim Scholars Association. In other words, even federalism might lead to internal Shiite wars between Badr and Sadr brigades and Sunni ones between the Shura and Islamic militias, as well as smaller and tribal groups especially in mixed population areas.

Surely, the situation is deteriorating. What might be done? Is a wider coalition of the willing involving the whole Middle East possible? Could the region’s Sunni powers Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan enforce a solution between the Sunni factions in a western semi-autonomous region? Could giving these nations real responsibility even diffuse some of the animus against Israel, which would not be worse off in any event? Is it even conceivable for Iran to help stabilize the Shiite forces in the south? With fellow Shiite rather than U.S. forces as neighbors might nuclear weapons look less essential? Or might the model used in Asia work here too? Nuclear proliferation is probably inevitable. The U.N. estimates 30 nations beyond the nine declared powers have programs that could quickly be turned into weapons. If backward North Korea can develop them, anyone can.

All of these local nations have an interest in regional stability. The forcing event may be the December deadline for renewal of the U.N. legal mandate to keep U.S. coalition forces in Iraq. The government has avoided renewing the mandate for fear that it would lead to further division and perhaps be the straw leading to full civil war. But it could also be the means for the U.S. to work with the Iraq government to negotiate a planned withdrawal of American and introduction of regional forces that takes away this biggest issue spurring the insurgent forces and allows the U.S. an honorable exit.

he U.S. should do a bit of regional thinking itself. It must face the fact that its historic allies are in decline and will not be available for long unless something is done very soon. Thirty-four European nations will see an absolute decline in population in the next fifty years while most of the rest of the world grows, especially Islam. Today, with 170 million more people, economic output in Europe is only-three quarters that of the U.S and declining. Less than half of its population is working, partially from aging and from a belief the government owes all a living. Can the U.S. revitalize the old virtues of sacrifice and work in a rational and humble manner for those who taught them to us, especially since those ideas are weakening here too? Latin America needs some thought too. It will be a lonely world without the world’s two most like-minded regions.

Regardless of the passion of a Gingrich, the ruthlessness of a Podhoretz or even the resolve of a Bush, the American people will not long accept the job of lone world policeman, much less world “squeezer,” especially when it does not seem to work. People within a region can understand it better and are better able to deal with problems there. Besides, even the rich and powerful U.S. cannot do it all. Limited power was the whole point of its own political constitution, something its people and leaders need to remind themselves of every so often.